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Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 69 (October 27, 2011)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – DEATH PENALTY
Summary
The Court considers an appeal of a death penalty sentence for a first-degree
murder conviction.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and held that no error existed that
would warrant a new trial. Under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f), the district court had good cause
to allow a late filing of a notice of evidence in aggravation. The danger of prejudice to
the defense in its preparation was a relevant factor in the good cause determination for
untimely notice. Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156 (2007) did not preclude admission of
presentence investigation reports at penalty hearings.
Factual and Procedural History
On September 22, 2006, Eugene Nunnery (“Nunnery”) and three other men, all
armed with guns, approached five men in an apartment complex parking lot and
demanded money. After one of the other men began to run, Nunnery shot one victim in
the head at close range and another in the back of the head as he was fleeing. Nunnery’s
companions also unsuccessfully shot at the other victims. The victim that Nunnery shot
in the head at close range was the only fatality.
Nunnery was charged with open murder, two counts of attempted murder,
conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, and two counts of attempted robbery. The State
sought the death penalty, and tried Nunnery and his codefendants separately. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The district court bifurcated the penalty
hearing.
In the first phase, the parties presented mitigating and aggravating evidence for
the jury to weigh. Although the State is required to file a notice of evidence in
aggravation at least fifteen days before the trial begins under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f), the
district court accepted the State’s filing twelve days before the trial began. The district
court found good cause existed for the untimely notice because Nunnery’s case was
supposed to be the last tried of the three cases against Nunnery and his codefendants.
The district court also found a lack of prejudice to the defense to prepare to confront the
evidence summarized in the notice because the State filed similar notices in the other two
cases and the attorneys for all three cases were the same. The jury concluded that the
mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
In the second phase, the state presented Nunnery’s criminal history and a victimimpact statement while Nunnery presented sociological and penological evidence. The
jury sentenced Nunnery to death for the first-degree murder conviction. The district court
sentenced Nunnery for the other charges in a separate hearing.
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Nunnery alleged several claims arising out of the penalty hearing. Nunnery first
challenged the district court’s finding that the State had good cause for filing a late notice
of evidence in aggravation and that he was not prejudiced. Nunnery alternatively claimed
that lack of prejudice is not relevant to the district court’s determination of good cause.
Furthermore, Nunnery challenged the admission of presentence investigation reports at
the penalty hearing and the instruction to the jury concerning mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Nunnery also made several guilt-phase hearing claims.
Discussion
Penalty Phase Claims
Notice of Evidence in Aggravation under SCR 250(4)(f)
Justice Cherry wrote for the unanimous Court, sitting en banc. The Court begain
its analysis by examining the notice requirements under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f). Under this
statute, the State must file a notice of evidence in aggravation, which includes a summary
of the evidence the State plans to present, at least fifteen days before the penalty phase of
trial is to begin in cases where the State seeks the death penalty. The court must not
allow introduction of evidence not included in the notice unless the State can show good
cause and the defense is permitted a continuance to prepare to confront the evidence. 2
The Court concluded that although Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) only addresses the late
introduction of evidence not summarized in the notice, it must similarly allow the late
filing of a notice of evidence in aggravation in order to avoid discouraging the State from
filing a late or amended notice.
To determine “good cause” under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f), the Court found factors
used in previous decisions regarding pretrial notice statutes persuasive. The Court
recognized that “good cause” is a relative term and “its meaning must be determined not
only by the verbal context of the statute in which the term is employed, but also by the
context of the action and procedures involved and the type of case presented.” 3 The
Court declined to apply the definition of “good cause” used in Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(d)4
because although “good cause” appears in both Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(d) and (f), the policies
and purposes of the provisions differ and thus warrant different definitions of “good
cause.” The Court concluded that Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) warrants the use of a broad
definition of “good cause” that allows courts to consider multiple factors.
The purpose of Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) is to provide the defendant with sufficient
notice to prepare to confront evidence while taking into account reasons for the delay.
When deciding whether “good cause” exists for a late notice filing, a court should
therefore consider any relevant factors, such as “(1) the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the State’s control, (2) whether the State acted in good faith, (3) the
length of the delay, and (4) the danger of prejudice to the defendant,” that are consistent
with the purpose of Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f). The absence of prejudice alone is insufficient
2
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When notice is not served, “[g]ood cause requires a reason external to the prosecutor” (quoting State v.
Dist. Ct. (Marshall), 116 Nev. 953, 968, 11 P.3d 1209, 1218 (2000)).
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to show “good cause” for filing a late notice. The Court determined prejudice by
considering the impact the evidence in aggravation had on the defendant’s preparation for
confronting that evidence, not the impact the evidence had on the jury’s penalty verdict.
The Court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, which is satisfied only if the
district court acted “arbitrar[il]y or capricious[ly] or if it exceed[ed] the bounds of law or
reason.” 5 The district court found good cause for filing a late notice of evidence of
aggravation because the delay in filing was not significant, the State did not act in bad
faith, the delay was only three days, there was sufficient opportunity for Nunnery to
object to the admissibility of the evidence and for the court to address that objection, and
no prejudice to the defense resulted from the late filing. The Court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion after considering these relevant factors.
Presentence Investigation Reports
In response to Nunnery’s challenge to the admissibility of presentence
investigation (PSI) reports at the penalty hearing, the Court concluded that PSI reports are
admissible at penalty hearings pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156(2). Nunnery relied on
Herman v. State,6 in which the defendant was granted a new penalty hearing after the
State read uncharged crimes, some of which were irrelevant to the crime charged, from a
PSI report. The Court renounced Herman’s interpretation that admission of uncharged
crimes in a PSI report is a violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156(5) because Nev. Rev. Stat.
176.156(2) states that law enforcement agencies may use PSI reports without limitation
in public hearings. The Court concluded that disclosures permitted by Nev. Rev. Stat.
176.156(2) are not precluded by the rule that PSI reports are not to be part of the public
record under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156(5).
The Court further renounced Herman’s conclusion that evidence of prior crimes is
inadmissible if irrelevant to the crime charged at the penalty hearing. The Court
concluded that evidence of uncharged crimes in PSI reports is admissible as “other
matter” evidence regardless if the evidence supports the defendant’s guilt. The Court
stated that “other matter” evidence is relevant because it allows the jury to determine its
sentence after considering the defendant’s “character, record, and the circumstances of
the offense.”7 This type of evidence can also be excluded if it is “impalpable or highly
suspect.” 8 The broad grant of power to the trial judge to determine which evidence
should be admitted at the penalty hearing under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.552 supports this
conclusion.
The Court concluded that because Nunnery did not object to any of the
information in the PSI report that was revealed to the jury at the penalty hearing, he
would have to show plain error to receive relief. The Court found that Nunnery did not
show any error because the PSI report preparer testified and was available for crossexamination, and arrests that did not lead to convictions were redacted from the PSI
report.
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Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
122 Nev. 199, 208-09, 128 P.3d 469, 474-75 (2006).
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Weighing Instruction
Nunnery challenged the district court’s refusal to issue a jury instruction that
would require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The Court found that the district
court did not err in refusing to give the jury instruction.
Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(2)-(3), the jury must weigh mitigating and
aggravating circumstances when the State pursues the death penalty. However, dicta in
Johnson v. State9 directly conflicted with the holding in McConnell v. State.10 Johnson
indicated that the jury’s weighing determination of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in a capital case must be held to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.11
However, McConnell held that the State may impose the death penalty without the jury
finding or the State proving that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reaffirmed McConnell and reversed
Johnson to the extent it conflicted with the Court’s holding that the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is not applicable because weighing mitigating and aggravating
circumstances is not a factual determination.
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is only applicable to the jury’s
determination that an aggravating circumstance exists, not to the weighing of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances. 12 Once the jury finds that at least one aggravating
circumstance exists, it must then determine whether there are sufficient mitigating
circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstance(s). 13 In Johnson, the court
found that the determination of whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist and
outweigh the aggravating circumstances is in part a factual determination and thus subject
to the Sixth Amendment.14 The Court held that the statement in Johnson was “correct to
the extent that it refer[red] to the finding of mitigating circumstances,” not the weighing
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
The Court also found that Nevada’s statutory scheme did not support the
conclusion that the weighing determination involves a factual determination, but rather
that the weighing determination is a purely judgmental process. The Court concluded
that the Nevada Legislature’s decision not to identify a burden of proof for the weighing
determination or require the Court to consider the sufficiency of evidence with respect to
the weighing determination in review of a death sentence supported its holding. 15 Out of
the three statutory provisions that address the weighing determination,16 only one uses the
word “finds” when referring to the weighing determination.17
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Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment gives defendants the
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See Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.055(2) (2007).
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Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(3) & (4); NEV. REV. STAT. 200.030(4)(a) (2007).
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Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(3).
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The Court further stated that the definition of “fact” supported its holding. The
Court defined a “fact” as “[a] thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring;
an event or circumstance,”18 and concluded that the weighing determination requires a
balancing of facts to reach a conclusion, not a finding of any facts.
Lastly, the Court held the district court did not err in refusing Nunnery’s
requested jury instruction because it stated the incorrect standard. Nunnery requested a
jury instruction that would require the jury to find that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances before giving the death penalty. However,
under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(3), (4), the death penalty is contingent on the jury finding
sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
The Great-Risk-of-Death-to-More-Than-One-Person Aggravator
Nunnery challenged the district court’s decision permitting the State to seek the
“great risk of death to more than one person” aggravator on four grounds. The Court
held that the district court did not err on any of these grounds.
Nunnery first argued that the State did not provide timely notice of the aggravator
because the notice of evidence in aggravation was filed three days late and the evidence
used to support this aggravator was unique to this case. The Court held that the late
notice of evidence did not prejudice Nunnery because the notice of intent to seek the
death penalty, filed a year before trial, informed Nunnery of the evidentiary basis for the
great-risk-of-death aggravator. Furthermore, this evidence was presented at the guilt
phase of trial.
Second, Nunnery argued that the State changed its theory for the aggravator in the
notice of intent to seek the death penalty to an accomplice theory in the notice of
evidence because the State referred to Nunnery “and his codefendants” in the latter and
not the former. Under Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(c), the supporting facts of an aggravator should
be in the notice so that the defendant can deduce the State’s theory for the aggravator.
However, the Court held that the State did not change its theory to an accomplice theory
because the State did not add the description of Nunnery’s codefendants in the notice of
evidence to base the aggravator on their conduct, but rather to show that Nunnery acted
as the leader of the crime, which placed several innocent people at risk of death.
Third, Nunnery argued that the notice of intent to seek the death penalty did not
include evidence that others were present during the shooting and thus did not support a
great-risk-of-death aggravator. The Court held that the statement in the notice of intent
describing the location of the crime as public place with citizens located nearby was
sufficient.
Fourth, Nunnery argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the
aggravator. The Court held that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Nunnery knowingly created a great-risk-of-death under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033(3)
(2007) because the State presented evidence that numerous people were near the crime
scene that Nunnery specifically chose.
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Evidence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
Nunnery challenged the district court’s refusal to admit testimony from Nunnery’s
cousin. Nunnery’s cousin would have testified that Nunnery’s mother drank alcohol
while she was pregnant with Nunnery and Nunnery had health problems when he was
born. However, the court may refuse to admit evidence that is “impalpable or highly
suspect” during the penalty phase of trial.19 The Court held that the record demonstrated
that the testimony of Nunnery’s cousin was highly suspect and the district court’s refusal
to admit the evidence because of it lacked credibility was not an abuse of discretion.
Juror Misconduct
Nunnery challenged the district court’s inquiry into juror misconduct as
inadequate and its refusal to declare a mistrial based on that juror misconduct, which
consisted of statements between jurors that an expert’s testimony was long and boring.
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a
mistrial because the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the alleged
misconduct and the juror misconduct allegations did not warrant a mistrial if proven.
Jury’s Rejection of Mitigating Evidence
Nunnery challenged his death sentence and claimed that the jury’s rejection of
mitigating circumstances supported by indisputable evidence was arbitrary and
capricious. The Court held that Nevada law allows jurors to decide the extent that a
mitigating circumstance decreases, if at all, the defendant’s moral culpability regardless if
the mitigating circumstance is supported by irrefutable evidence.
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
The Court held that Nunnery’s claims that the death penalty is unconstitutional
failed because Nevada’s death penalty statutes do not violate the Eighth Amendment, do
not foreclose executive clemency,20 and provide a narrow class of persons eligible for the
death penalty.21
Guilty Phase Claims
Jury Selection
Nunnery challenged the district court’s admission of a peremptory challenge of
the only African-American potential juror. An equal protection challenge to the
admission of a peremptory challenge requires the opponent to first prove a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the proponent who must offer a neutral
explanation for the challenge, and finally the burden shifts back to the opponent who
19
20
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Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 138, 825 P.2d 600, 607 (1992).
Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, 812-15, 919 P.2d 403, 406-08 (1996).
Thomas v. State, 122 Nev. 1361, 1373, 148 P.3d 727, 735-36 (2006).

must prove purposeful discrimination.22 The Court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting the peremptory challenge because the State offered a
neutral explanation, the juror’s views on the death penalty, for the challenge and the
defense did not argue that the State’s explanation was mere pretext for discrimination.
Had the defense challenged the State’s explanation, the Court nevertheless would have
held that purposeful discrimination did not exist.
Nunnery also challenged the district court’s admission of three challenges for
cause based on the jurors’ death penalty views. The Court upheld the district court’s
ruling because rulings on challenges for cause are afforded great deference23 and will not
be overturned if a juror could not have adequately performed his duties because of his
death penalty views,24 which each of the three jurors indicated.
Motion for Mistrial
Nunnery claimed that a detective’s testimony alluded to Nunnery’s involvement
in other homicides and warranted the district court declaring a mistrial. A district court’s
denial of a motion for mistrial will only be overturned if a clear showing of abuse
exists. 25 The Court held that a clear showing of abuse did not exist under the
circumstances because the testimony Nunnery referred to was vague, brief, and did not
allude to his involvement in other homicides.
Guilt-Phase Jury Instructions
Nunnery challenged the validity of several jury instructions that he claimed
lessened the State’s burden of proof and did not specify the material elements of the
crimes. Nunnery argued that each of the challenged jury instructions should have stated
the State’s burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court held that the district court’s jury instructions did not abuse its discretion because
three other instructions contained the standard of proof and the Court has repeatedly
upheld similar instructions.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Nunnery challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he
had the requisite intent for the attempted murder charges because he did not shoot at the
specific victims or encourage his codefendants to shoot at them. The Court reviewed the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and held that a rational juror could
determine that sufficient evidence existed to prove each material element beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court held that the record indicated that Nunnery had the specific
intent to kill the victims because in addition to shooting two of the victims, Nunnery
planned the crime and directed his codefendants to bring guns.
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Mandatory Review of the Death Sentence Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.055(2)
Every death sentence must be reviewed to (1) ensure that the evidence supports
the finding of at least one aggravated circumstance, (2) the death sentence was not
imposed as a result of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor, and (3) the death
sentence was not excessive in relation to the crime and the defendant.26 The Court first
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to find six aggravated circumstances based on
the circumstances of the crime. Nunnery had four prior violent felonies convictions,
created a great risk of death to more than one person, and committed the homicide during
the commission of a robbery. Second, the Court held that the record did not indicate that
the jury’s death sentence was a result of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor. Third,
the Court held that the death sentence was not excessive because Nunnery’s actions
indicated he was a violent person who disregarded human life and did not have any
remorse for his cold-blooded killings.
Conclusion
Upon a showing of good cause, the district court has discretion to permit an
untimely notice of evidence in aggravation. Relevant factors in determining good cause
include the risk of prejudice to the defense in its preparation to confront the evidence.
Second, Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156 does not preclude the admission of presentence
investigation reports at penalty hearings. Third, the weighing of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances is not a factual determination and the proper inquiry to justify
a death sentence is whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh
aggravating circumstances, not whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances.
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